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Eric A. Posner1 
 
 
Abstract. This paper examines the effect of tort rules on behavior if people are optimistic 
or insensitive relative to true probabilities. The paper shows that under certain conditions 
both strict liability and negligence cause levels of care that are higher than, or equal to, 
what is efficient (rather than lower). The paper also shows that under certain conditions 
strict liability and negligence cause the same level of activity among optimists (more than 
is efficient). Other implications for tort law are discussed, as are the sensitivity of the 
results to the choice of how to model probability errors. Implications for contract law, 
and some normative issues, are also discussed. 
 
 Evidence from experiments and empirical studies suggests that people make 
systematic errors when they estimate probabilities. The exact nature of these errors 
remains controversial, but two themes are that people discount low probability events, 
treating them as though they occur with a probability of zero, and that, more generally, 
people are insensitive to small differences between probabilities. The first bias might 
cause a homeowner to treat the probability of a remote event like an earthquake as though 
it were equal to zero; the second bias might cause a person to divide potential accidents 
into a small number of categories—high, medium, and low. I will follow the literature 
and call the first problem one of “optimism,” though, as we shall see, this term is 
imprecise; and I will call the second problem one of “insensitivity.” 
 
 Legal scholars think that optimism and probability insensitivity justify additional 
regulation because optimists will take too little care. If the driver of an automobile 
believes that the risk of an accident is zero, he will drive too quickly. But the truth turns 
out to be more complex. A person who discounts remote risks might take too much care, 
rather than too little. By increasing his level of care incrementally, the person can reduce 
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his perceived probability of an ac , from some positive amount to 
zero the 
additional care, the person will use m efficient, and this is true regardless 
hether the legal rule is strict liability or negligence. 
 
 
Even i
probab
amount
categor
inflexio
betwee
tains some general 
omments about the treatment of probability errors in normative law and economics. 
cident nonincrementally
. If the perceived reduction in expected accident costs exceeds the cost of 
ore care than is 
w
This result holds as well for people who suffer from probability insensitivity. 
f they do not treat low probability events as though they would occur with 
ility of zero, they will enjoy large perceived benefits when they can take a small 
 of additional care in order to move the risk of an accident from the “high” 
y to “medium,” or “medium” to “low.” The existence of discontinuities or 
n points in probability functions plays havoc with intuitions about the relationship 
n the law and decisions about care level. 
 
 This paper explores these and other implications of optimism and insensitivity for 
the law.2 The focus (Part I) is on optimism and tort law. My other main result is that 
sufficiently optimistic agents engage in the same level of activity under strict liability and 
negligence; by contrast, rational agents engage in more activity under strict liability than 
under negligence. The reason for this difference is that the optimistic agent under strict 
liability and the rational agent under negligence do not internalize accident costs when 
they take due care (or what they think is due care). I also discuss the difference between 
harm-sensitive and harm-insensitive optimism; the relationship between optimism and 
probability insensitivity; and the implications of optimism for bilateral accidents. Part II 
briefly discusses optimism and contract law, and Part III con
c
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discussions of error by courts, see Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal 
Standards, 2 J.L. Econ. & Org. 279 (1986); Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law 79-83 
(1987); of misperceptions of the effect of care on expected liability, see Peter A. Diamond, Single Activity 
 The law and economics literature does address error and misperception, but in a different context. For 
Accidents, 3 J. Legal Stud. 107 (1974), Shavell, supra; and, relatedly, of the effect of judgment-proofness 
r a survey. 
and causation requirements on incentives, see William M. Landes & Richard Posner, The Economic 
Structure of Tort Law (1987), Shavell, supra. There is also a related literature on consumer protection and 
misperception; see Richard M. Hynes & Eric A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Consumer Finance, 4 
Amer. Law & Econ. Rev. 162 (2002), fo
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I. Probability Errors and Tort Law 
 
 A. Summary of Analysis 
 
 Suppose that agents are rational except that they are optimistic about low 
uld take too little care, whether the tort 
gime is strict liability or negligence. The analysis will show that for sufficiently high 
ve a 
ramatic effect on the probability of a bad event occurring. 
 
probability accidents. When they engage in some behavior like driving, they know that 
their behavior creates a risk of harm. When choosing the level of care, agents know the 
actual probability of harm associated with each level of care when the probability is 
above some threshold; below that threshold the probability of harm, which is low but 
positive, is treated as though it were zero. 
 
 Intuition tells us that such an agent wo
re
levels of optimism, the agent might take too much or too little care. The effect that causes 
too little care is the discounting of harms: the agent underestimates expected liability for 
a high level of care, and so will take less care. The effect that causes too much care is that 
the agent can cause a (subjective, that is, error-driven) reduction of expected liability by 
taking a small amount of additional care. If the agent takes some level of care that causes 
a perceived positive probability of harm, and if a small additional amount of care would 
cause that probability to drop from the threshold amount to zero, then the agent will think 
that he is, in effect, taking a small extra precaution that will eliminate all potential 
liability. Which of the effects dominates depends on the relationship between the 
probability distribution, the level of harm, and the care function. Optimism could cause 
an agent to think that a bad event will not occur, or that a little extra care will ha
d
 In addition, for sufficiently low levels of optimism, the agent will take the optimal 
care, and this amount of care is invariant with respect to the amount of optimism below a 
threshold. The agent does not take too much care because the amount of care necessary to 
create zero perceived expected harm is greater than the sum of the cost of optimal care 
and the correctly perceived expected harm. The agent does not take too little care because 
3 
at the optimal level of ca an ac ately anticipated by the 
w-optimism agent. 
A well known result in the literature is that for unilateral accidents, strict liability 
t remote events as though they do not occur, 
nd so the main difference between strict liability and negligence—namely, that under 
t carry over to the case of 
ptimism. Strict liability with contributory negligence encourages rational victims but not 
re cident is risky enough to be accur
lo
 
 
and negligence have the same effect on care, but different effects on the level of activity. 
Strict liability causes the efficient level of activity; negligence causes too much activity. 
However, the difference between the two rules nearly disappears when the agent is 
optimistic. Both rules cause too much activity; indeed, unless the risk is sufficiently 
remote, the two rules cause the same level of inefficient activity. The reason is that under 
both regimes the optimistic agent will trea
a
negligence the agent is not liable if he takes due care—disappears in the agent’s mind. 
 
 Next, I show informally that the results can hold even under less extreme 
assumptions about probability misestimation. The factor that drives the results is not the 
possibility that people could treat certain probabilities as though they were zero, but the 
possibility that people have trouble thinking of probability distributions as smooth or 
continuous functions and divide lower and higher probability events into discrete groups. 
 
 Finally, I argue that for bilateral accidents the different effects of strict liability 
and negligence on rational individuals carry over to the case of optimism: both rules 
cause the injurer to take care but only negligence causes the victim to take care. 
However, under both rules the level of care taken by injurer and victim will not be 
optimal. As for activity level, the different effects of strict liability with contributory 
negligence, and negligence, on rational individuals do no
o
rational injurers to engage in too much activity; negligence encourages rational injurers 
but not rational victims to engage in too much activity. By contrast, the two rules have 
the same effect on optimistic injurers and victims, encouraging both groups to engage in 
too much activity. 
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 B. Analysis 
 
1. Level of Care 
Strict liability will cause the agent to choose x*; negligence will cause the agent to 
oose
nction pi(x), where 
 
 
 Let: x = level of care (normalized, so x is also the cost of care); p(x) be the 
probability of an accident, as a function of the level of care (p'(x) < 0; p"(x) > 0); h = 
harm. For illustrative purposes, we assume that p(x) = x–2. For simplicity harm is a 
constant: the agent controls only the probability of the harm occurring. 
 
 The total (that is, social) cost function, TC = x + x–2 h. The optimal level of care 
x* = (2h)1/3. 
 
 
ch  x* if (for example) the agent must pay h if x < x*. Figure 1 illustrates these 
standard results.3 
[Figure 1] 
 
 Now we want to ask what happens if the agent has an irrational probability 
fu
   pi(x)  = x–2  if p(x) > p  
    = 0  otherwise. 
The value of p  refers to the floor below which the probability of the accident is so small 
that the agent treats it as if it were 0. 
 
Corresponding to p  is a level of care, x', which is the threshold between levels of 
care associated with accurate probability assessments and levels of care associated with 
optimistic probability assessment. To determine the value of x', we must first make an 
additional assumption about whether the agent’s optimism is sensitive to the level of 
harm or not. Consider the driver of an ordinary truck and the driver of a tanker truck 
                                                 
an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J Legal Stud 323 (1973); Shavell, 
supra note __; Landes & Posner, supra note __. 
3 See John Prather Brown, Toward 
5 
filled with gasoline. One could imagine that each driver is equally insensitive to a low 
robability accident for a given level of care x, where p(x) < p p
rst (harm
p , so x' = (1/ p )
   xi =  x* if p  ≤ 24/3h1/3 / 9 ≈ 0.27 h1/3 
i i
i 1/3 2/3 1/3
, but one could also 
agin at th tanker is more sensitive. In the fi -insensitive) case, 
i(x) = x–2 if p(x) > 
im e th e driver of the 
1/2. In the second (harm-sensitive) case, pi(x) = x–2 if p
p(x) > p /h, so x' = (h/ p )1/2. I will assume that optimism is harm-sensitive, which seems 
more realistic, but will briefly discuss the harm-insensitive case in Section I.B.3. 
 
 The agent will minimize TCi = x + pi(x)h. There are two separate cases to 
onsider. First, if pc  is sufficiently low, and thus x' is sufficiently high, the agent will 
choose x  = x*. The reason is that the level of care necessary to reach x' is higher than the 
combined care and accident costs for x*. Think of a driver who believes that he can 
reduce the probability of an injury to zero only by driving a Volvo but the ownership cost 
of a Volvo is greater than the joint cost of owning a Honda and expected liability from an 
accident. The driver will not buy the Volvo but will buy the Honda and take efficient 
care. 
 
Second, if 
i
p  is not too low, and thus x' is not too high, xi = x'. This is the case 
where the ownership cost of the Volvo, and thus the illusory sense of never being liable, 
is less than the combined ownership and expected accident costs of the Honda. 
 
To find the dividing line between the two cases, one sets the cost of the 
“irrational” level of care that generates illusory expected zero liability (Volvo) equal to 
 rational care (Honda): TC(x') = TC(x*). Because 
C(x') = x' (the expected accident cost is zero), we have: x' = (h
the joint care and accident costs for
/ pT )1/2 = TC(x*) = (3h)1/3 / 
22/3. Simplifying: 
   x' otherwise 
If we limit ourselves to the second case, where x  = x', then we can ask whether x  is 
greater than or less than x*. Setting x  = x*, we get p  = h  / 2  ≈ 0.63 h . It turns out 
that it could be either. 
6 
   If p  < 0.63 h1/3, then xi > x*. 
   If p  ≥ 0.63 h1/3, then xi ≤ x*. 
Thus there are three regions: 
 
Table 1 
Low Optimism Moderate Optimism High Optimism 
p  ≤ 0.27 h1/3 0. 27 h1/3 < p  < 0.63 h1/3 0.63 h1/3 ≤ p  
x  = x* x  = x' > x* x  = x' ≤ x* i i i
Optimal Care Too Much Care Too Little Care 
 
 In the first region, the probability threshold (where the agent treats the probability 
of the event as though it were zero) is so remote, that the agent would need to incur a lot 
of care in order to reach it. Because the cost of care is so high, the agent would prefer 
choosing the level of care that minimizes the “rational” total cost function. This is the 
xample where the agent buys the Honda rather than the Volvo. 
 
it worthwhile to take extra care in order to reduce expected accident cost from a positive 
amount to an amount he perceives as 0. See Figure 2. The optimal level of care while 
driving
thinks that if he does these things and buys antilock breaks he will never have an 
accident. He takes too much care because the extra precaution creates the illusory sense 
of no expected liability. 
[Figure 2] 
 
 In the third region, an inefficiently low level of care is sufficient to reach the 
entive to take additional care. See Figure 3. 
[Figure 3] 
e
In the second region, the probability threshold is not so remote, so the agent finds 
 is, let’s suppose, a good night’s sleep and driving during the day; but the agent 
probability threshold, and the agent has no inc
The agent thinks that a good night’s sleep is sufficient to reduce the probability of an 
accident to zero; therefore, he does not bother confining his driving to the day. 
7 
  Figure 4 shows care as a function of optimism. For low levels of optimism, care is 
x*. Above p  = 0.27 h , care1/3  is a declining function of optimism. 
[Figure 4] 
 
  have assu ut what ab f the 
agent assumes that courts will set the level of due care at xi rather than x*, then the results 
remain the same. The agent will take too little care or too much care, depending on 
Negligence. We med strict liability, b out negligence? I
p  
and h. Thus, the agent has the same care incentives under strict liability and negligence. 
 
But there is another possibility. If the agent believes that the court (irrationally!) 
 of care to x'. 
 
 
will insist on setting the due care level at x*, then the agent’s behavior under negligence 
and strict liability will differ but only in the midlevel optimism case. In the latter case, the 
agent will prefer to incur the cost of optimal care x*, rather than too much care, x', 
because x* < x'. Under negligence, the agent does not bear expected accident costs if he 
takes level of care x*, so he gains nothing by increasing the level
 
2. Activity Level 
 
 Now suppose that the agent can choose his level of activity. Let s = level of 
activity, and u(s) equal the agent’s level of utility from engaging in a certain level of 
activity (u'(s) > 0, u"(s) < 0). Then the utility function is: u(s) – sx – sp(x)h = u(s) – s(x + 
p(x)h). The agent maximizes utility by minimizing the value of the negative expression, 
which means choosing optimal care x*; and then by choosing an activity level s* that 
maximizes utility given the per-unit join re and expected liability.4 
 
 
                                                
t cost of ca
Using our earlier probability function, p(x) = x–2, it follows that utility is 
maximized if x* = (2h)1/3 (minimizing the negative expression) and if s* is such that u'(s) 
= (2h)1/3 + ((2h)1/3)–2h = (3h)1/3 / 22/3. 
 
 
4 Shavell, supra note __, at 41. 
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 Now let us look at the agent’s incentives if he uses optimistic probability 
stimat
 Strict Liability 
e es. 
 
 
 The agent will choose s and x to maximize u(s, x) = u(s) – sx – spi(x)h. Recall that 
if p  is low enough, the agent will choose xi = x*. Otherwise, the agent will choose xi = x'. 
Let us consider the two cases separately. 
 
In the first case, where the agent chooses xi = x*, the agent internalizes the  
expected harm, and thus acts the same as the rational agent. Thus, he chooses si = s*. 
 
 In the second case, where the agent chooses xi = x', the agent’s utility function is, 
in effect, u(s) – sxi. The reason is that at xi = x', the agent treats the probability of the 
accident, and thus the expected accident cost, as though it were zero. Thus the agent will 
choose si such that u'(s) = xi = x' = (h/ p )1/2. Intuitively, the agent will choose si ≥ s*, 
ecause the only internalized cost of his activity is the level of care, and not the expected b
accident cost. 
 
 Proof. In the second case the agent chooses xi = x' because he has more than low 
optimism: p  ≥ 0.27 h1/3. Manipulating the inequality, we get (h/ p )1/2 ≤ (3h)1/3 / 22/3. The 
left side of the inequality is u'(si), and the right side is u'(s*), as we saw above. Thus u'(si) 
≤ u'(s*). Because u"(s) < 0, si ≥ s*. 
 
 This shows that the optimistic agent will engage in too much activity as long as 
p  is not too low. The reason is that he will simply not take account of some of the cost 
(low probability harms) that he inflicts on others. For arbitrarily low values of p , the 
agent will engage in the optimal level of activity. Thus, for a sufficiently broad 
distribution of p , strict liability results in too much activity. 
 
9 
 Negligence 
 
Under negligence, the rational agent will choose s and x to maximize u(s) – sx. 
aximize u'(s) – x*. Because the agent does not internalize the 
xpected cost of accidents if he takes due care, he will engage in too much activity.5 
e court will apply xi as the standard of care. In 
e low optimism case, where xi = x*, the agent will act the same as the rational agent and 
oose
In the second case, where xi = x', the agent will choose si to maximize 
(s) – 
 
Thus, he will choose s* to m
e
 
The optimistic agent will choose s and x to maximize u(s) – sxi, where, as before, 
we assume that the agent believes that th
th
ch  si = s*. 
 
u p –1/2. Thus, the agent will choose the same high level of activity as under strict 
liability.6 
 
 We can summarize the results as follows. (1) When the agent is sufficiently 
optimistic, strict liability and negligence will have the same effect on activity. When the 
agent’s optimism is at a low level, strict liability produces efficient activity and 
egligence produces too much activity, just as they do for the rational agent. (2) Under 
r, he will (usually) act like a rational agent under a 
egligence regime, where no liability is attached to careful behavior that causes expected 
arms. 
 
n
strict liability and negligence, the sufficiently optimistic agent might engage in too much 
care as well as too little care (xi could be greater, less than, or equal to x*), and he will 
engage in too much activity (si > s*). The point is that if the agent treats low probability 
events as though they will not occu
n
h
                                                 
5 Id. 
6 This assumes that the agent believes the court will choose xi as due care; if not the moderate optimism 
case becomes the same as the low optimism case, as explained above. 
10 
 3. Level of Harm 
 and 
ss likely to take too little care. It is worth mentioning that one would get a different 
result i
imism Moderate Optimism High Optimism 
 
 It is clear from Table 1 that the level of harm will affect the chances that the agent 
will take the optimal level of care, or too much or too little. As harm increases, the agent 
is more likely to take the optimal level of care; more likely to take too much care;
le
f one assumed harm-insensitive optimism. The analogous table is: 
 
Table 2 
Low Opt
p  < 0.63 h–2/3 0.63 h–2/3 ≤ p ≤ 0.27 h–2/3 0. 27 h–2/3 < p  
x  = x* x  = x' > x* x  = x' ≤ x* 
Op
i i i
timal Care Too Much Care Too Little Care 
 
Now, as harm increases, the agent is less likely to take the optimal level of care; more 
likely to take too much care; and more likely to take too little care. 
 
 The optimal level of care increases with harm. The harm-insensitive optimist will 
not internalize the increase in harm, while the harm-sensitive optimist will internalize it 
partially. This is why an increase in harm will cause the harm-sensitive optimist to act 
more efficiently than the harm-insensitive optimist. 
 
Figure 5 shows care as a function of harm. The curve labeled x*(h) depicts 
optimal care rising at a declining rate with the level of harm. The curve labeled xi(h) 
epicts irrational care. Note that it matches x*(h) at high levels of harm; otherwise it is 
too low or too high except when the curves cross. The curve labeled xii(h) shows harm-
insensitive care, which of course is a horizontal line, invariant with respect to h, except at 
high levels of harm. 
[Figure 5] 
d
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 Fig 5 also shows houre w courts, in theory, could adjust awards in order to give 
fficient incentives to optimists. Focusing on the harm-sensitive case (the court can’t 
ffect t
e thrust into the 
egion of the midlevel optimist, and act as though he were rational. This result holds in 
the region of midlevel optimism (where  x*(h) cross on the left, and join on the 
right). At a higher level of optimis crease the a level 
of optimi does not t 
 
 4. erality: Alternative P istributions
e
a he behavior of the harm-insensitive agent except at high levels of harm), where the 
level of harm is roughly in the middle of the x-axis, the court could provide efficient 
incentives either by reducing the award or by increasing the award. If the award is 
reduced, the agent will take a level of care that is optimal for a rational agent but below 
optimal for the optimist. If the award is increased enough, the agent will b
r
xi(h) and
m, the court should in ward; at a lower 
sm, the court  need to adjus the award. 
Gen robability D  
 
One objection to the analysis so far is that the assumed probability distribution (or 
ccident as long as he 
kes little care, but then when his care exceeds a threshold, he then inaccurately thinks 
However, my results do not depend on people believing that low probabilities are 
zero or
ent thinks that for a range of lower care behavior the probability of 
an accident is the same high number; fo  medium care behavior the probability 
f an accident is the same middle number; and for a range of low care behavior the 
 
class of probability distributions) is implausible. It does not seem likely that when a 
person drives a car, he accurately estimates the probability of an a
ta
that the probability of an accident is zero. Indeed, the evidence for optimism is mixed, 
and other evidence suggests that in some settings people overestimate the probability of a 
small harm. 
 
 
 even that they optimistically underestimate probabilities. My results can hold 
even if people are pessimistic, and overestimate the probability of a small harm. The 
necessary assumption is only that people are insufficiently sensitive to probabilities. 
 
 One might think, for example, that the agent’s subjective probability could be a 
step function. The ag
r a range of
o
12 
probability of an accident is low, though not necessarily zero. It remains the case that the 
agent could take too much or too little care. Too little care is easy to understand; too 
much care will occur as long as the perceived drop in probability occurs soon enough 
after the optimal level of care, that the decline in expected accident liability is greater 
than the increase in the cost of care. Thus, the result does not depend on a discontinuous 
probability function, just on the function having at least one inflection point and a 
sufficiently steep slope soon after the optimal level of care. Nor does the result depend on 
optimism; the tail of the step function (for example) could be higher than the tail of p(x). 
 
 One other possibility is that people are optimistic, but that the optimism does not 
affect the slope of the objective probability function. Formally, pi'(x) = p'(x) and pi(x) < 
(x) for all x. If p(x) is a linear function, for example, then pi(x) would be just a parallel 
e most natural, but it is 
consistent with the literature, which suggests that people are more likely to be wrong 
5. Bilateral Accidents
p
line that is below p(x). This assumption might seem to be th
in
about low probability events than about high probability events. But even if we accepted 
this assumption, it has an interesting and unintuitive result, namely, that the agent would 
take the optimal level of care (neither too much nor too little) under both strict liability 
and negligence. The reason is that the marginal benefit of care remains the same if the 
slope does not change. Thus, the current tort system provides the correct incentives for 
care (although not for activity level) even if agents are optimistic. 
 
  
ause 
e injurer to take optimal care; but full compensation under strict liability gives the 
ictim 
 
 Suppose that the victim as well as the injurer can reduce the probability of an 
accident by taking care; thus p(x, y). If both agents estimate probabilities correctly, then 
strict liability produces less efficient levels of care than negligence does. Both rules c
th
v no incentive to take care. Negligence, by contrast, makes the victim bear the cost 
of his own carelessness when the injurer takes due care but the accident occurs anyway.7 
 
                                                 
7 See Brown, supra note __; Shavell, supra note __; Landes & Posner, supra note __. 
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 Now suppose that both parties are optimistic. As we saw before, the injurer will 
take the same level of care under both rules. Putting aside for the moment the level of 
care, the first thing to see is that the effect of the two rules on the victim remains the 
same: the victim will have no incentive to take care under strict liability, and will have 
such an incentive under negligence. Now returning to the question of level of care, the 
injurer could take too much or too little care; the victim under the negligence regime will 
also take too much or too little care, both because the victim himself is optimistic, and 
because the victim’s choice will be affected by the inefficient level of care chosen by the 
jurer.8 
C. Insurance and Redistribution 
The argument so far illustrates some of the complex implications of probability 
timat
in
 
 As to the question of activity level, for rational agents strict liability with a 
defense of contributory negligence causes victims to engage in too much activity; 
negligence causes injurers to engage in too much activity.9 For sufficiently (midlevel or 
high level) optimistic agents, under both rules victims and injurers will engage in too 
much activity. For strict liability with contributory negligence, the injurer will act as 
though he were governed by a negligence rule and not internalize accident costs above xi. 
For negligence, the victim will act as though he will not incur accident costs above yi. 
Thus, the two rules have the same behavioral effects, and the choice between the rules no 
longer matters. 
 
 
 
 
es ion error for care and activity level. Here, I will briefly point out its implications 
for insurance and redistribution, focusing on optimism. 
 
 If people underestimate low probability events, they will buy too little insurance. 
But if they are optimistic, they might take too much, rather than too little, care. For 
                                                 
8 There are interesting variations that one could consider: suppose that victims are rational and mistakenly 
ink that the injurer will choose x* rather than xi. Or that the victims are rational but understand that 
injurers will choose xi. One could also assume that the injurer is rational but the victim is optimistic, and so 
on. 
th
9 Shavell, supra note __. 
14 
e e, rather than putting in too few smoke detectors because he is heavily insured, a 
homeowner might put in too many smoke detectors in order to reduce his perceived 
probability of a serious fire to zero. An uninsured optimist, then, might face less risk of 
fire than an insured person who is rational. 
 
 Jolls argues in a different context that optimism can justify redistributing wealth 
through the tort system.10 Because people underestimate low probability events, 
redistributive tort awards will distort neither their care nor their labor/leisure choice, and 
so will h
xampl
ave a less negative effect than high taxes, which people can anticipate more 
asily and which distort their labor/leisure choice. In terms of the model, Jolls argues that 
nt shows that redistributive tort awards can distort the behavior of 
ptimists. 
II. Some Comments on Probability Errors and Contract Law 
er an incomplete contract for the 
elivery of a good. Buyer has valuation, v. At time 2, Seller chooses a level of care, x. At 
me 3
e
the award should be h + t, where t is the transfer, when the defendant is wealthy. 
 
The problem is that increasing the award from h to h + t will distort behavior. To 
see why, look at Figure 5, and imagine that h is the midpoint of the x-axis. The optimist’s 
level of care, xi(h) is already too high, and xi(h + t) would be even worse. The court could 
produce optimal care by reducing the award by some amount r, such that xi(h – r) = 
x*(h). Although there are cases where a positive transfer, t, would also reduce the 
distortion, Figure 5 provides no reason to think that awarding t is anything but arbitrary, 
and in any eve
o
  
 
 The argument so far has implications outside tort law. Consider the following 
model of contract law. At time 1, Seller and Buyer ent
d
ti , Seller either performs or pays damages, d. Seller’s cost is either 0 or, with 
                                                 
10 Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1653 
(1998). Jolls’ argument, as she acknowledges and discusses, depends on some assumptions, which are in 
my view questionable: that the stochastic loss won’t be converted into a certain (small) loss through 
ttery” is not politically feasible. insurance, and that a “tax lo
15 
probability p(x), a high amount c, where c > v. We suppose that the market is competitive 
and Buyer pays a price π equal to Seller’s expected cost. 
 
 If transaction costs were zero and the parties could enter a complete contract, they 
ould agree that Seller will take a level of care x* that minimizes the joint cost of care 
Suppose now that both Buyer and Seller are irrationally optimistic and think that 
the pro
t he will be optimistic when he chooses x. If a complete contract is possible, 
 include a provision requiring him to choose x* (and will hope that 
renegotiatio not revent such 
 course of action: a court might not be able to determine x*. Another possibility is to 
contrary to much of the literature, that the existence of cognitive biases is not necessarily 
w
and loss to the Buyer (v – π) that results if Seller does not perform. That is, x* solves min. 
p(x)c + x. Buyer pays price π = x* and earns a return of v – x*. Seller obtains a return of 
0. If transaction costs are positive and the parties cannot enter a complete contract that 
specifies x*, then the optimal level of damages is v – π, that is, expectation damages, 
which cause Seller to choose x*.11 
 
 
bability distribution is pi(x). The analysis is the same as in the tort case. A 
complete contract would specify xi, which could be greater or less than x*; if the contract 
is incomplete and expectation damages is the remedy, the same result will be achieved. In 
addition, people will enter too many contracts because they will discount losses caused 
by low probability events (as before). 
 
 Suppose instead that Seller is rational at the time that he enters the contract but 
expects tha
he will want to
n is  possible at time 2). But verifiability problems will often p
a
agree to liquidated damages. If the Seller expects to choose xi < x*, then he will want low 
liquidated damages; if he expects to choose xi > x*, then he will want high liquidated 
damages. The reason is that liquidated damages can be used to shift the pi(x)h curve up or 
down, in such a way as to cause the optimistic Seller at time 2 to choose x*. This shows, 
                                                 
11 Cooter and Ulen, supra note __. 
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an argument for the penalty doctrine. Parties might agree to high liquidated damages in 
order to blunt the effects of optimism.12 
 
III. Welfare 
 
 In welfare economics, it is conventional to assume that the goal of the state is to 
maximize social welfare, which is some aggregation of the individual utility functions of 
all citizens. 
 
 Suppose that an agent prefers driving a car to taking a bus, but only because he 
nderestimates the probability of a car crash. Should the state tax car driving in order to 
ake th
e activity that can injure only himself, and no one 
lse. He is an optimist, and ignores the small chance that the activity will injure him. 
and risk estimation—are not easily reconcilable with welfare economics, and thus cannot 
                                                
u
m e agent act the same way as he would if he knew the correct probability of the car 
crash? The legal literature answer this question positively, and a positive answer was 
implicitly assumed in the analysis in Parts I and II of this paper. 
 
 But the problem is more complex. To see why, consider the simplest case. 
Suppose that an agent engages in som
e
Suppose the government now mandates a precaution that reduces the low probability of 
an injury to zero. The agent will perceive this mandate as a cost, with no offsetting 
benefits. Therefore, his utility will decline, and so will the social welfare function. A 
welfare-maximizing government would therefore not impose what otherwise would seem 
to be a sensible mandate. 
 
 The problem also occurs in the more general tort case, whenever victims are 
optimistic. High tort awards designed to counter the wrongdoer’s carelessness will not be 
experienced as an ex ante gain by the victim, and will not affect the victim’s behavior. 
The insights of cognitive psychology—especially those relating to biases in perception 
 
12 Cf. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The “New” Law And Psychology: A Reply To Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious 
 (2000). Supporters, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 739
17 
be straightforwardly imported into normative law and economics. Many normative 
proposals made by authors writing within “behavioral law and economics” fail to address 
is problem. 
 
This is not to say that the problem is insoluble. But solving it requires a 
if one unknowingly takes high risks than if one does not. Or welfare could 
volve not just having any preference, but the right kind of preferences, and when a 
us ways that probability errors can be formalized, and their 
plications for tort and contract law. 
are. The model also allows for indirect tests of optimism: if people are harm-sensitive, 
th
 
conception of welfare different from the conception used by economics. One could 
imagine that welfare is objective in the sense that regardless of one’s preferences one has 
less welfare 
in
person’s preference for driving is not sufficiently informed, that preference does not fully 
count in the person’s welfare. But these are difficult and complex problems that have not 
been resolved by economists and philosophers. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The most important methodological point I want to make is that when one tries to 
operationalize the insights of cognitive psychology, and make them useable for law and 
economics, one must make certain specific assumptions about the shape of probability 
functions, and terms like “optimism” are too vague to be of help. A person who 
underestimates low probability events might be called an optimist, but he also might be 
called a pessimist (in certain ranges) about the likelihood that more care will avoid 
accidents. The pessimist about care might act the same as the optimist about liability. The 
paper has explored vario
im
 
 The paper also has some testable empirical implications. One might use 
psychological exams to test for optimism, and then see whether optimistic people take the 
same level of care under strict liability and under negligence, or whether optimistic 
people are more likely to take too much care under both rules than nonoptimistic people 
then they should take the optimal level of care when harm is low, higher levels of care 
18 
when harm is moderate, and lower levels of care when harm is high. Indirect tests like 
these would be difficult, and open to multiple interpretations, but they might be a useful 
way for avoiding the problem of measuring optimism. 
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